- summary
- Citizen Lab confirmed in 2021–22 that Pegasus had been used against lawyer Roman Giertych, prosecutor Ewa Wrzosek and senator Krzysztof Brejza, whose phone was infiltrated 33 times between April and October 2019 while he ran the opposition's parliamentary election campaign; stolen messages were later doctored and broadcast by state television. PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński acknowledged in January 2022 that Poland had bought Pegasus. In April 2024 Prosecutor General Adam Bodnar said Pegasus had been used against 578 people between 2017 and 2022 by three agencies: the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), Military Counterintelligence and the Internal Security Agency.
- country
- Poland
- date text
- 2019
- entities
- Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), Military Counterintelligence Service, Internal Security Agency (ABW) under the PiS government
- entity type
- Security Apparatus
- id
- 1163
- name
- Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), Military Counterintelligence Service, Internal Security Agency (ABW) under the PiS government
- role
- actor
- Opposition senator Krzysztof Brejza (Civic Coalition election campaign chief), lawyer Roman Giertych, prosecutor Ewa Wrzosek and others — 578 people in total, 2017–2022
- entity type
- Individual — Politician / Lawyer / Prosecutor
- id
- 1164
- name
- Opposition senator Krzysztof Brejza (Civic Coalition election campaign chief), lawyer Roman Giertych, prosecutor Ewa Wrzosek and others — 578 people in total, 2017–2022
- role
- target
- Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), Military Counterintelligence Service, Internal Security Agency (ABW) under the PiS government
- sources
- tactics
- Surveillance Infrastructure / Spyware Deployment
- label
- Surveillance Infrastructure / Spyware Deployment
- code
- TC-21
- needs review
- false
- role
- primary
- Confidential Data Leak and Broadcast
- label
- Confidential Data Leak and Broadcast
- code
- TC-16
- needs review
- false
- role
- secondary
- Surveillance Infrastructure / Spyware Deployment
- channels
- Covert spyware infection (Pegasus)
- civic response
- Victims went public with Citizen Lab forensics; a Senate special committee heard evidence (2022). | Outcome: after the change of government the Sejm set up a Pegasus investigative committee (17 January 2024) and the Prosecutor General disclosed the scale of use (578 people) and notified victims.
- consequence category
- Operational Suppression
- created at
- 2026-09-25T12:58:50.19638+00:00
- date precision
- year
- escalation
- 5
- harm track
- Track 3 — Operational Suppression
- id
- POL-001
- institutional consequence
- Data seizure/exposure; Stolen data leaked and broadcast; Chilling effect
- notes
- Coded Sep 25 2026. Date = Brejza infections during the 2019 election campaign; overall use 2017–2022. Secondary TC-16: stolen messages doctored and broadcast by state TV. First Polish case in the database.
- occurred on
- 2019-01-01
- response ids
- trigger type
- TR-08: Proactive / Ambient
- updated at
- 2026-09-25T12:58:50.19638+00:00
- version
- 1
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