{"id":"TUR-032","notes":"First stage of two-part information criminalisation campaign; second stage is TUR-043 (Law 7418 disinformation law)","country":"Turkey","sources":[{"url":null,"citation":"TUSEV CSO Monitoring Matrix Turkey 2020-2021; Law No. 7253 (31 July 2020); BTK enforcement records"}],"summary":"Law No. 7253 amended Law No. 5651 to require all social media platforms with more than one million daily users to appoint a Turkish legal representative, store data of Turkish users on servers in Turkey, and remove content within 48 hours of notification. Non-compliance triggered 50% to 90% bandwidth throttling and advertising bans. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, and others initially refused but complied after throttling was implemented. Law extended BTK's content removal authority to include platform-level liability.","tactics":[{"code":"TC-18","role":"primary","label":"Legislative Operationalization","needs_review":false},{"code":"TC-41","role":"secondary","label":"Media Distribution Exclusion","needs_review":false}],"version":1,"channels":["BTK","court orders","Parliament","RTÜK"],"entities":[{"id":1117,"name":"Grand National Assembly; BTK (Information Technologies Authority); RTÜK","role":"actor","entity_type":"Legislature; State Regulatory Body"},{"id":1118,"name":"Social media platforms; journalists; civil society communicators; online news sites","role":"target","entity_type":"Media; CSO; Individual"}],"date_text":"31/07/2020","created_at":"2026-09-24T17:50:55.358311+00:00","escalation":4,"harm_track":"Track 2 — Information Environment","narratives":[{"code":"NF-10","role":"primary","label":"Sovereignty Protection / State Security Infrastructure","needs_review":false},{"code":"NF-06","role":"secondary","label":"Destabilization Agent","needs_review":false}],"report_ids":[],"signal_ids":[],"updated_at":"2026-09-24T17:50:55.358311+00:00","occurred_on":"2020-07-31","campaign_ids":["TUR-CAMP-007"],"enabler_type":"","response_ids":[],"trigger_type":"TR-08: Proactive / Ambient","campaign_phase":"Phase 2: Institutionalization of Mechanism","civic_response":"Platforms initially refused and accepted throttling; digital rights groups documented chilling effects; RSF and CPJ issued alerts; all platforms ultimately complied","date_precision":"day","enabler_status":"","campaigns_served":[],"consequence_category":"Digital Censorship; Regulatory Compliance Burden; Platform Capture","institutional_consequence":"All major global platforms now operating under Turkish jurisdiction with local representative liable for content removal; Turkish users' data held locally; government content removal compliance rate increased significantly"}