{"id":"ARM-001","notes":"Coded Sep 25 2026. Transnational: the likely operator is a foreign state, not the Armenian government. Date = first targeting; range Oct 2020 – Dec 2022. First Armenian case in the database.","country":"Armenia","sources":[{"url":"https://www.accessnow.org/publication/armenia-spyware-victims-pegasus-hacking-in-war/","citation":"https://www.accessnow.org/publication/armenia-spyware-victims-pegasus-hacking-in-war/"},{"url":"https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/armenia-azerbaijan-pegasus-spyware-targeted-armenian-public-figures-amid-conflict/","citation":"https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/05/armenia-azerbaijan-pegasus-spyware-targeted-armenian-public-figures-amid-conflict/"},{"url":"https://citizenlab.ca/2023/05/cr1-armenia-pegasus/","citation":"https://citizenlab.ca/2023/05/cr1-armenia-pegasus/"},{"url":"https://cpj.org/2023/05/at-least-5-members-of-the-press-covering-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-targeted-by-pegasus-spyware-report/","citation":"https://cpj.org/2023/05/at-least-5-members-of-the-press-covering-armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-targeted-by-pegasus-spyware-report/"}],"summary":"A joint investigation by Access Now, CyberHUB-AM, Citizen Lab, Amnesty's Security Lab and researcher Ruben Muradyan (published May 2023) found that the iPhones of 12 Armenian civil society figures were targeted with NSO Group's Pegasus between October 2020 and December 2022, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan. Circumstantial evidence links the targeting to the conflict; the investigation did not formally attribute the operator, though Azerbaijan is a known Pegasus customer.","tactics":[{"code":"TC-21","role":"primary","label":"Surveillance Infrastructure / Spyware Deployment","needs_review":false},{"code":"TC-51","role":"secondary","label":"Direct Intimidation of Journalists and Civic Actors","needs_review":false}],"version":1,"channels":["Covert spyware infection (Pegasus), including zero-click iOS exploits"],"entities":[{"id":1165,"name":"Unattributed Pegasus customer; circumstantial evidence points to the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict","role":"actor","entity_type":"Foreign state (suspected, unattributed)"},{"id":1166,"name":"12 Armenian civil society figures: a former Human Rights Defender (Ombudsperson), two RFE/RL Armenian Service journalists, a UN official, a former Foreign Ministry spokesperson (now at an NGO) and seven others","role":"target","entity_type":"Individual — Journalist / Human rights defender / CSO"}],"date_text":"10/2020","created_at":"2026-09-25T12:58:50.511674+00:00","escalation":5,"harm_track":"Track 3 — Operational Suppression","narratives":[],"report_ids":[],"signal_ids":[],"updated_at":"2026-09-25T12:58:50.511674+00:00","occurred_on":"2020-10-01","campaign_ids":[],"enabler_type":"","response_ids":["CR-ARM-001"],"trigger_type":"TR-08: Proactive / Ambient","campaign_phase":"","civic_response":"Armenian partner CyberHUB-AM worked with Access Now's Digital Security Helpline, Citizen Lab and Amnesty to check devices and publish the findings (May 2023), with calls for accountability and a global moratorium on spyware sales.","date_precision":"month","enabler_status":"","campaigns_served":[],"consequence_category":"Operational Suppression","institutional_consequence":"Data seizure/exposure; Chilling effect"}