{"id":"BIH-CAMP-003","label":"RS foreign agent campaign (2021-2025)","notes":"Largest BiH cluster. Mirrors Serbian playbook with RS-specific adaptations. Cross-border pattern with SRB-CAMP-006 (USAID exploitation). | CAMPAIGN ARC: 15+ year documented sequence (2009-2026). Russian playbook transferred via FSK/SVR-linked conference (2014). FARA framing propaganda architecture established 2014, recycled through 2025. Three legislative attempts: 2015 (withdrawn), 2023 (withdrawn), 2025 (enacted then annulled). Only campaign in database with documented full arc from ambient seeding to constitutional reversal. | SELECTIVE APPLICATION DOCUMENTED — CAMPAIGN IS POLITICAL TARGETING, NOT TRANSPARENCY: RS institutions simultaneously received the same foreign funding campaigned against: (1) RS Police Director at USAID-connected conference, San Diego 2023; (2) USAID-funded basketball camp linked to Dodik family (Igokea club), 2019; (3) RS Ministry of Education in USAID \"Tabla\" project (STEM labs, tablets for schools), 2021; (4) Savez opština i gradova RS organized USAID/GIZ-supported competition; (5) Trebinje signed USAID/UNDP agreement for Via Dinarika tourism project, 2020 (backed by SNSD minister Košarac). Most damning: Dodik himself stated January 2022 after meeting USAID administrator: \"USAID has given serious money to RS and we are grateful for the help provided.\" This statement directly contradicts the transparency rationale for the foreign agent law. Confirmed: the foreign agent label is a political targeting instrument selectively applied to critics, not a neutral transparency mechanism — proven by the actor's own words and institutional conduct. | SELECTIVE POLITICAL ALIGNMENT CONFIRMED: Korajlić (TI BiH) explicitly names Hungary — \"funding from Hungary, which has helped the RS government greatly, is not considered problematic.\" The foreign agent label is applied based on which country funds you, not the act of foreign funding itself. Western democratic donors (US, EU, UK) = foreign agent risk. Hungary (Orbán-aligned) = acceptable. Russia = acceptable. This is political targeting by ideological alignment, not a transparency mechanism — documented by the practitioner most directly affected. Source: Danas, September 2023.","country":"BiH (RS)","created_at":"2026-09-24T17:50:55.358311+00:00","report_ids":[],"incident_ids":["BIH-004","BIH-008","BIH-010","BIH-014","BIH-015","BIH-016","BIH-019","BIH-020","BIH-021","BIH-022","BIH-026","BIH-027","BIH-028","BIH-029","BIH-030","BIH-031","BIH-036","BIH-037","BIH-040","BIH-042"],"needs_review":false,"trigger_type":"Legislative process + External political event","end_date_text":"Oct 2023","phase_pattern":"Official enemy labeling (2009) → Ambient Seeding → Russian playbook transfer/academic legitimization (2014) → First legislative attempt (2015) → Authorization → Legislative proposals (2023) → GONGO dilution → Foreign agent law enacted (2025) → Constitutional annulment (2025/2026)","trigger_event":"Multi-year foreign agent law push + USAID suspension (2025)","incident_count":20,"start_date_text":"2009","authorization_actor":"Milorad Dodik (RS President)","institutional_consequence":"Foreign agent law proposed then withdrawn after 14 months; re-introduced and enacted Feb 2025; defamation criminalized; USAID suspension exploited"}